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In this paper, we test the effect of three different criminal deterrence theory policy tools: 
criminal certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment. Whereas most criminal deterrence studies 
in this field focus on the former two components of deterrence theory, this study also examines 
the potential deterrent effect of the latter component. Using a time-series design with monthly 
data, we estimate the effects of an increase in the threat of punishment for traffic offenses 
resulting from a general increase in fines for traffic offenses, an increase in the probability of 
getting caught with a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) level outside the legal limits, and the 
enactment of an “on-the-spot” fine payment policy in Portugal.  We find strong evidence to 
support a severity effect. An increase in the statutory severity of sentence maxima for traffic 
violations leads to a decrease in accident and injury rates—approximately an average 0.5 percent 
reduction in monthly accident and injury rates. Changes in the BAC levels and the mandatory 
swift payment policy did not produce any convincing deterrence impact. 
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When traffic statistics are published, Portugal usually tops the charts on accident and 
mortality figures.  In 1995, Portugal ranked first among twenty five European Union countries in 
fatalities by population on motorways (CARE, 2006). Despite being comparatively high, accident 
and injury rates have very recently begun to decrease, both in absolute and relative terms. In 
2000, Portugal trailed Latvia and Greece with the third highest traffic fatality rate per million 
inhabitants.  Latest data confirm a downward trend, with Portugal occupying tenth place among 
the European Union countries in the ranking (CARE, 2006). During this period, fatalities per 
million inhabitants decreased from 271 in 1995 to 124 in 2004. Portuguese authorities have 
already proudly claimed credit for this decrease since stricter traffic legislation was enacted in the 
late 1990s. However, a more systemic analysis must be undertaken in order to test this political 
statement.  Were Portuguese drivers deterred by the increase in the certainty, severity and 
celerity of punishment policies for traffic violations? Or, in other words, to what extent are these 
policy changes associated with a reduction in the accident rate resulting in death or injury? 
The literature on deterrence is primarily concerned with the probability of detection and 
punishment for a specific category of traffic offenses—drunk-driving offenses. National 
governments, however, frequently employ deterrence policies that are not targeted specifically at 
alcohol-related incidents. These aim to reduce many different types of reckless behaviour at the 
wheel, including but not limited to, drunk-driving, aggressive driving, dangerous passing, and 
speeding.  Furthermore, empirical work on drunk-driving systematically employs traffic fatalities or 
similar measures as dependent variables, even though only a relatively small proportion of 
accidents with victims occur as a result of drinking-and-driving behaviour (Deshapriya and Iwase, 
1996). In Portugal, drunk-driving incidents represent about thirty percent of all traffic accidents, 
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while in the European Union only one in four traffic accidents are alcohol-related (European 
Commission, 2006).  
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the large body of empirical studies by 
investigating the effects of deterrence-based traffic policies aimed at reducing reckless driving in 
general. We conduct this study in a setting that is usually understudied--Portugal. This is 
surprising for reasons mentioned above. Its outstanding record in traffic casualties demands a 
systemic investigation of the effects of governmental strategies in this policy area. An additional 
argument that makes this country an interesting site for investigation is the fact that the 
government has already claimed credit for a recent downward trend in accidents. This empirical 
observation is unsubstantiated scientifically and requires statistical testing. Given that the 
systematic collection of statistics on traffic accidents only began in the 1990s in this country, we 
are limited to traffic policies that have been implemented during and after that period.  
Specifically, we examine the impact of a three-fold package of deterrence-based 
government interventions implemented in the latter half of the 1990s. These interventions raised 
the penalties for traffic offenses, and in this way increased the severity of punishment, and 
increased the likelihood of detection while driving under the influence by tightening the limits of 
blood-alcohol concentration (BAC). Finally, government intervention made punishment swifter by 
establishing the immediate mandatory payment of pecuniary sanctions for traffic offenses at the 
site of violation when stopped on the road.  We test the hypothesis that by increasing the levels of 
severity, certainty, and celerity of traffic policies, the legislation enacted by the Portuguese 
government in the 1994-2004 period, resulted in a significant reduction in the number of traffic 
accidents, injuries, and fatalities. We test this hypothesis using multivariate autoregressive 
moving average models with monthly aggregate data, given that there is, as of yet, no systematic 
collection of individual-level data in Portugal. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Following a brief review of the literature on criminal 
deterrence policies to combat traffic accidents and mortality rates, we review the main policies 
implemented in Portugal since the restoration of the democratic regime in the mid-1970s and 
formulate our working hypotheses. Next, we present the results of our analysis and finish with a 
discussion of the results and their policy implications. 
 
Deterrence Policies to Improve Road Safety 
Although the beginnings of the literature on traffic safety date back to the late 1930s 
(Holcomb, 1938), it was not until the late 1970s and early 1980s that empirical studies became 
more commonplace. It has, since this time, remained an active subject in applied public policy 
studies. Most of the literature examines the effect of diverse government interventions aimed at 
deterring drivers from breaking the law, and, in this way, reducing traffic accidents and fatalities. 
In turn, most of the deterrence literature on traffic policy focuses on negative deterrence, both at 
the perceptual and aggregate levels. These studies investigate the threat of detection and 
punishment through legal and administrative sanctions and aim at increasing the expected cost of 
reckless driving.  
Given that reckless driving is a form criminal behaviour, governments encourage 
compliance with the law by adopting and enforcing a system of incentives, penalties, and controls 
so as to prevent criminal behaviour on the road. In doing so, they lay the foundation for an orderly 
transit system. Deterrence theory is a doctrine that makes that foundation possible by supplying a 
means with which to provide predictability in individual behaviour. It is based on the assumption 
that individuals are rational beings that balance private benefits and costs of undertaking a 
criminal activity in order to maximize their expected utility (Becker, 1968). As such, individuals in 
a society can be induced to comply with the law through their reactions to incentives and 
disincentives. 
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Deterrence operates at two distinctive levels. It dissuades those who experienced certain, 
swift, and/or severe punishment for traffic violations from committing the same infractions 
(specific deterrence), while simultaneously achieving a preventive effect by discouraging the 
general population from engaging in socially undesirable actions on the road (general deterrence) 
(Andenaes, 1975). Long-term effects of deterrence policies can be accomplished if a strict and 
persistent application of sanctions actually changes civic behaviour and habits behind the wheel 
(Deshapriya and Iwase, 1996).  
Most deterrence policies in the literature on traffic safety fall into three groups: 1) 
enforcement policies; 2) punishment policies; 3) celerity policies. Enforcement policies are 
regulatory policies that set up mandatory actions or impose limits aimed at reducing the level of 
traffic accidents and the number of casualties resulting from these accidents. Because they seek 
to increase the probability of detection, prosecution, conviction, and punishment of drivers 
breaking the law, enforcement policies are concerned with the certainty of punishment. According 
to Becker (1968), the certainty and severity components are clearly identified as two equally 
relevant options available to reduce crime. Although deterrence theory does not specify which of 
its elements should have a greater effect on criminal reasoning, empirically speaking, of the three 
groups, enforcement policies are generally found to have the most relevance, consistently 
revealing statistically deterrent effects (Benson et al., 1999; Mendes, 2004). These policies 
include more visible law enforcement efforts (Benson et al., 1999), sobriety checkpoints (Fell et 
al., 2003; Kenkel, 1993), preliminary breath tests (Kenkel, 1993; Rhee and Zhang, 1993), and the 
establishment of a limit of blood alcohol concentration (BAC) above which it is illegal per se to 
drive. This latter policy tool is perhaps the most representative policy of this category (Dee, 2001; 
Eisenberg, 2003; Legge Jr. and Park, 1994; Mann et al., 2001). Dee (2001) studied 19 state laws 
establishing as illegal per se to drive with a BAC of 0.08 and concluded that these laws have 
been effective in reducing the number of traffic fatalities, especially among young adults. 
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Additional research by Eisenberg (2003) found that states lowering the illegal per se limit from 
0.10 to 0.08 obtained a 3.1 percent reduction in fatal crash rates. However, this effect was 
somewhat delayed in time, indicating the need for public awareness campaigns to accomplish 
this policy effect. 
Empirical research has also focused on regulatory policies that are less relevant for our 
study, such as policies that establish the minimum legal drinking age (Asch and Levy, 1990; 
Legge and Park, 1994), enforce mandatory seat belt laws (Houston and Richardson, 2002, 2006; 
Legge, 1990), mandatory vehicle inspections (Fuchs and Leveson, 1967; Loeb, 1990), and 
ignition interlock systems (Weinrath, 1997). All these studies have found some evidence that 
these policies are successful in decreasing accident, fatality, or injury rates. 
With respect to the second category, punitive policy tools in the literature on traffic safety 
fall under the category of legal and/or administrative sanctions. These sanctions aim at increasing 
the severity of punishment under the assumption that harsher criminal penalties deter drivers 
from engaging in reckless behaviour at the wheel (Legge and Park, 1994). Several authors, 
having tested for the severity components of deterrence policies, found statistically significant 
effects for heavy pecuniary fines (Briscoe, 2004; Yu, 1994), jail terms for first offenders (Kenkel, 
1993), mandatory license suspension/revocation (Kenkel, 1993; Legge and Park, 1994; Ross and 
Gonzales, 1988), and vehicle impoundment (DeYoung, 2000).  
Celerity policies seek to reduce the time elapsed between a traffic violation and the 
administration of the sanction. Yu (1994) is an individual level study that examines the specific 
deterrent effect on drunk-driving by specifying the celerity and severity of punishment. He found 
that the probability of recidivism is greatly reduced with a combination of increased fines and 
mandatory license withdrawal, but no measurable effect was noted for celerity as an independent 
punishment factor.  
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Some authors argue that deterrent strategies also produce effects on a moral dimension 
of human behaviour, promoting a positive change in drivers’ behaviour in the long run (Andenaes, 
1971; Deshapriya and Iwase, 1996; Snortum and Berger, 1989). According to this argument, the 
goal of deterrence policies is not simply to discourage prospective reckless driving by upping the 
costs associated with it, but also to foster law-abiding driving by appealing to or instilling a sense 
of civility. Publicity and advertisement campaigns that stress certain, swift, and severe penalties 
to individuals engaging in reckless driving create a negative social construct surrounding 
undesired or offending acts (Ross, 1984; Tay, 1999, 2004, 2005) and produce a “threat of 
embarrassment” (Akers, 1990; Berger and Snortum, 1986; Grasmick et al., 1993; Green, 1989).  
 
Traffic Policies in Portugal 
The approval of the 1994 Driver’s Code1, replacing the previous 1954 Code, was the first 
organized and coherent effort to adopt comprehensive traffic policy legislation. The main purpose 
of the 1994 code was to update the legal rules and penalties for reckless driving and to compile 
the vast set of piecemeal legislation approved throughout that forty-year period. The 1994 code 
introduced a system of demerit points by which drivers lose their licenses if they accumulate more 
than a given number of points resulting from the degree of seriousness of the offense. 
Nevertheless, the seriousness of the traffic problem in Portugal prompted the national 
government to enact several laws beginning in the mid 1990s that reflect a strong inclination 
towards deterrence-based legislation. 
Our period of analysis begins in January 1995 and ends December 2004. This decade is 
marked by three major modifications to the Code. Firstly, in January 1998, the Portuguese 
government approved legislation targeting both general and specific deterrence. The Portuguese 
parliament approved new legislation with a strong emphasis on the severity of penalties 
searching for a significant increase in the expected cost for committing traffic violations. This 
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legislation increased fines for serious and very serious driving offenses and introduced license 
suspension between one month and one year for serious offenses and between two months and 
two years for very serious offenses. Recidivism was also taken into consideration, with courts 
being allowed to remove, for a period of one to five years, the license of drivers with alcohol or 
drug addiction, with three very serious offenses or five serious offenses in a five-year period.  
The second major change during this 10-year period was the introduction of a legal limit 
of 0.2 g/l (grams per litre) of blood alcohol level.2 Drunk-driving offenses are one of the major 
causes of traffic accidents and fatalities, and this new, extremely stringent limit was considered to 
be a way to produce significant reductions in these statistics. However, this decision did not hold 
for a long period of time. In fact, only eleven months after its statutory adoption, the 0.2 g/l level 
was revoked and the 0.5 g/l level was restored as the legal limit,3 as a result of pressures from 
the wine industry, one of the largest business interest groups in Portugal.  
Finally, the third main change in traffic policy was the introduction of mandatory ‘on-the-
spot’ payment of fines in October 2001.4 Like other governmental authorities (Yu, 1994), 
Portuguese officials felt that the inefficacy of the fine-collecting system was undermining the 
deterrent impact of fines. They felt that something should be done to address this problem. In 
order to assure higher efficacy, or in other words, greater certainty in the application and 
collection of fines, the ‘on-the-spot’ policy makes it compulsory for drivers stopped for a specific 
offense, to immediately pay a fine for that offense, as well as any other outstanding fines he or 
she may have.   
These policies enacted throughout the period clearly point to an emphasis on deterrence-
based policies. Taken together, all three of these policy changes can be considered as a 
‘package’ in order to improve the probability of success of these deterrent strategies (Mendes, 




As mentioned above, deterrence theory embodies three policy tools that are under the 
immediate control of government authorities. These tools affect the components that can alter the 
expected cost of punishment. These are the certainty of punishment (through the probability of 
arrest and/or the probability of convictions), the severity of punishment, and the celerity of 
punishment.   
Authors often argue that merely raising the penalties without investing in the perception 
of a higher probability of detection and conviction is the easy, but ineffective way for legislators to 
attempt to raise the expected cost of punishment. To register a dissuasive effect in the potential 
criminal’s mind, more offenses have to be detected and a greater proportion of the offenders 
have to be convicted. In other words, offenders have to perceive a ‘certainty’ that they will be 
caught and subsequently punished. Also, if criminals go unpunished, arresting loses much of its 
influence. If the severity of punishment for a given crime increases but potential offenders 
perceive that they are not going to get caught, the increase in severity loses its dissuasive effect. 
For deterrent strategies to have any chance for success, they need to address criminal behaviour 
as a ‘package’.  In other words, all elements operate in combination to affect the expected cost of 
punishment (Mendes, 2004; Mendes and McDonald, 2002). 
Most aggregate level deterrence studies estimate potential deterrence effects of severity 
and certainty of punishment. Exceptions include policies that target the proximity of punishment 
(Yu, 1994). Very few studies at the aggregate level, as opposed to individual level, are able to 
incorporate a time element given the absence of aggregate statistics on the celerity of 
punishment. This is primarily due to the perceptual nature of the value that an individual places 
on the proximity or longevity of punishment in time. 
In this study, we conduct an empirical analysis to test for deterrent impact of the 
imposition of heavier fines, the introduction of on-the-spot payment of fines, and the changes in 
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BAC levels. All three policies result in an increase of the expected cost of punishment in 
accordance with criminal deterrence theory.  
Ideally, in keeping with deterrence theory, studies should test the effect of this expected 
cost of punishment on the traffic offense rate, given that it is the most adequate measure of 
reckless driving. Empirical studies on the deterrent effect of traffic policy generally, however, do 
not focus on traffic offenses. Rather, the dependent variable is usually measured as some form of 
accident rate. The present case is no different; monthly statistics on traffic offenses are not 
available, leaving us to infer any deterrent effect through changes observed in the rates of traffic 
accidents, fatalities, and injuries. These are our proxies for driving behaviour. Public authorities 
promoting deterrence-based policies anticipate a reduction in these rates. Our general hypothesis 
is as follows: 
H1: An increase in the deterrent cost of punishment for traffic offenses 
decreases reckless driving. 
 
We operationalize this hypothesis by breaking the deterrent expected cost into its 
deterrent components. In the present case, these components refer to the severity of punishment, 
as seen through an increase in fines, as well as the changes in the BAC level, and the increase in 
the celerity of punishment embodied in the mandatory prompt payment of fines. The deterrence 
literature generally employs the probability of detection and/or conviction to measure the certainty 
of punishment. However, as with the vast majority of empirical studies on the deterrent effect of 
traffic policy, no statistical measure of reckless driving arrests is available in Portugal. Legge and 
Park (1994) argue that illegal per se laws can be considered proxy measures of the certainty of 
punishment because they increase the probability of detection of illegal behaviour by defining a 
specific level of BAC as conclusive evidence of guilt (see also Benson et. al., 1999). This would 
allow the inclusion of BAC laws as proxies for the certainty of punishment. Thus: 
 




H3: An increase in the certainty of punishment reduces reckless driving. 
 
H4: An increase in the celerity of punishment reduces reckless driving. 
 
Data and Methods  
Following prior empirical work by Briscoe (2004), we examine three measures of our 
dependent variable, reckless driving, that account for the level of road usage: (1) monthly 
accidents with victims per 100,000 registered vehicles (Accident Rate) (2) monthly fatalities per 
100,000 registered vehicles (Fatality Rate), and (3) monthly injuries per 100,000 registered 
vehicles (Injury Rate) from January 1995 to December 2004.5 All dependent variables appear in 
log form to allow for the interpretation of coefficients as growth rates. 
Our variables of interest are policy interventions which take the form of dummy variables 
coded ‘0’ before each intervention and coded ‘1’ in the months following the intervention. The first 
policy came into effect in January 1998, the 37th month of these series. The second and third 
interventions occurred on October 2001, the 82nd month of our series, when on-the-spot payment 
of fines and the 0.02 BAC limit began. The third intervention, however, was short-lived, since new 
legislation enacted 11 months later reinstated the BAC level at 0.05. In this case, the BAC 
variable is coded ‘0’ both before and after the 11-month period. Figures 1 to 3 show all policy 
interventions in the three non-differenced series. The first month of each series is January 1995 
and the three series show a clear downward trend during the period of analysis, with no abrupt 
shifts. 
[Figures 1-3 about here] 
In extending our model specification to include control variables, we are limited to the 
data that are available on a monthly basis. These data include only vehicle inspections and the 
level of precipitation. In 1993, vehicle safety inspections became mandatory in Portugal. The 
number of automobile safety inspections increased significantly during our period of analysis. 
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This is thought to have had some impact in reducing the rate of road accidents because it 
removed older and/or structurally defective vehicles from the road. 
Accidents, fatalities, and injuries are likely to be influenced by bad weather, but the 
direction of the change is uncertain a priori, either because drivers increase safety precautions 
and drive slower in rainy conditions or because poor driving conditions actually cause more 
accidents. The amount of precipitation in millilitres is employed to control for weather conditions.6 
Table 1 displays a short description and summary statistics for the dependent, intervention, and 
control variables. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Multivariate autoregressive-moving average models are used to explain the variation in 
our series. These models include both explanatory variables and error terms which are partially 
‘explained’ by a time series model (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). The model assumes the 
following form: 
yt = a0 + a1x1t + a2x2t + -1 (B)(B) t 
Where t is a normally distributed error term which may have a different variance from t, the 
error term of the original regression equation. This model contains both a structural explanation of 
that part of the variance of yt which can be explained structurally and a time-series “explanation” 
of that part of the variance of yt which cannot be explained structurally (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 
1998: 590). As recommended by Pindick and Rubinfeld (1998), we arrive at the structural part of 
the model as a product of theoretical argument, whereas the time-series part of the model is the 
result of an analysis of the residuals of the structural model. 
An ARIMA (1,1,1) process describes the noise component of the accidents rate series. A 
similar noise component characterizes the injury rate series. The fatality rate series has a more 
complex error structure characterized by an ARIMA (3,1,1). All series were differenced to remove 
non-stationarity and all models include monthly dummies to control for seasonal effects. 
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A battery of diagnostic tests was conducted to assess the ARIMA portion of the 
estimated equations. Tests confirm that the ARIMA terms are both stationary and invertible. All 
diagnostics conducted confirm that residuals are purely white noise, thus indicating the absence 
of serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity. Table 
2 reports the results of Least Squares estimates with ARMA components. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Findings 
As we can see from Table 2, the results of our analysis strongly indicate that the 
legislative efforts to increase the severity of punishment for traffic violations have a strong 
deterrent effect. An increase in this form of severity of punishment leads to a decrease in two out 
of three measures of our dependent variable. That is, the 1998 legislation targeted at recidivist 
behaviour was successful in decreasing accidents and injuries. The legislative increase in 
penalties produces a significant average decrease in accident and injury rates of 0.5 percent and 
0.4 percent, respectively, but not in fatality rates. Although the sign is in the same direction, the 
increase in severity in the latter model is not sufficient to produce any discernible effect on the 
number of deaths per 100,000 vehicles, at least as far as we can tell with our data. 
Notwithstanding the failure of statistical efficiency due to data limitations, the absence of an effect 
may be due to the fact that fatalities represent a small fraction of total accidents and injuries, a 
fraction that is most often associated with extreme recklessness behind the wheel. Individuals 
who engage in this type of behaviour are likely not affected by marginal changes in sentences, so 
it is not altogether surprising that this type of traffic incident is not responsive to sentence 
maxima.   
The results of our certainty of punishment policy are not as conclusive. The changes in 
BAC levels are only significant only at the 90 percent confidence level in two of the three series, 
accident and fatality rates, and should, therefore, be read with caution. Although the efficiency of 
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the coefficients falls short of the conventional level of statistical significance of 95 percent, it may 
be worthwhile to at least mention these results, given the exploratory nature of the design and the 
limited model specification. If one can accept this argument as plausible, one could tentatively 
say that these results seem to indicate that the BAC legislation in Portugal, leads to an increase 
in accident and fatality rates—on average, 0.5 percent and 0.14 percent, respectively. This may 
indicate that the inconsistency in the BAC limit legislation could have sent mixed signals, inducing 
erratic, rather than predictable, behaviour.  
Our results also fail to show any strong indication of an impact of the celerity policy on 
reckless driving.  In the case of the injury rate, the enactment of the on-the-spot payment policy 
actually points to an increase in reckless driving, although this effect is also only significant at 
the 90 percent confidence level.  
 
Discussion 
What are the policy implications of these results? Taken together, they suggest that 
the deterrent impact is not as effective as it could be. In other words, the current package of 
Portuguese traffic policies is very likely not maximizing the threat of punishment. The fact that 
the increase in fines may likely decrease reckless driving does not mean that the magnitude of 
this decrease is as large as it could be. As argued above, the severity of punishment does not 
work independently of the certainty and celerity components. Together, they determine the 
expected cost of punishment that, in the end, should affect drivers´ reasoning while behind the 
wheel. The ambiguity with respect to the certainty and celerity components of deterrence 
theory thus compromises the overall impact of expected cost of punishment on drivers’ 
behaviour.  
Government strategies need to focus on the certainty of punishment first. Generally 
speaking, Portuguese drivers are risk takers. Hidden police surveillance videos often reveal 
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shocking and aggressive manoeuvres. This may be due to a low enforcement level, and, 
consequently, a low perception of the probability of getting caught driving recklessly. The 
Portuguese government could stand to gain in rethinking its budget for criminal deterrence. 
Increasing the upper limit in fines for traffic violations is not a policy tool that puts any strain on 
the deterrence budget; on the contrary, it actually increases government resources at the same 
time that it decreases traffic violations. This extra cash flow could be reinvested in the police 
budget. By investing more resources toward increasing the enforcement level of the BAC 
policy and police patrol and detection in general, the combined deterrence efforts of the 
severity, certainty and celerity factors could yield a more efficacious threat of punishment.    
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we test deterrence theory as it applies to traffic policy in Portugal. 
Following a brief review of the literature and a description of this Portuguese traffic legislation, 
we test for an effect of the certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment through three different 
policies enacted by the Portuguese government since the mid 1990s. One policy intervention 
increased the severity of punishment by raising penalties for traffic offenses.  Another policy 
intervention tightened the limits of blood-alcohol concentration (BAC), only to loosen them a 
few months later. Finally, we also examine a celerity policy that called for the immediate 
mandatory payment of pecuniary sanctions for traffic offenses when stopped on the road. 
 Using a multivariate autoregressive moving average design and a dataset assembled 
for the purpose of this study, we find strong evidence of a deterrent effect of the increase in 
fines in the case of accident and injury rates. This increase in sentence maxima leads to an 
approximate average reduction of 0.5 percent in monthly accident and injury rates. There is no 
clear evidence of any discernible effect of the changes in the BAC levels and the enactment of 
“on-the-spot” fine payment policy does not produce any convincing effects on these rates.  
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The policy implications of this study are straightforward. Our results suggest that 
Portuguese efforts to reduce reckless driving need to focus on the police end of the deterrence 
package.  A greater perception of the enforcement of the BAC policy, and consequently, of the 
on-the-spot payment policy could generate more conclusive deterrent effects. Although the 
increase in fines may very likely reduce traffic violations, the increase in the expected cost of 
punishment from the severity component could be greater if policies were also designed to 
increase the likelihood of punishment. Not only that, but additional deterrent effects resulting 
from more efficacious certainty and celerity policies would further increase the expected threat 
of punishment and decrease reckless driving. 
 
Notes 
1. Law-Decree 114/94, May 3. 
2. Law-Decree 162/2001, May 22 and Law-Decree 265-A/2001, September 28.  The actual 
change in BAC levels came into effect on October 1. 
3. Law 20/2002, August 21. A 0.5 g/l level is a 0.05 BAC (Blood Alcohol Concentration) or 0.05 of 
alcohol by volume. 
4. Law-Decree 265-A/2001, September 28. 
5. Data were provided by the Direcção Geral de Viação (Department of Motor Vehicles) and the 
Associação Portuguesa de Comércio de Automóveis (Portuguese Automobile Trade 
Association). 
6. Vehicle inspection data are available from the Department of Motor Vehicles and rainfall 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Description Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variables      
Accident Rate Series 
 
Accidents with Victims per 
100,000 registered vehicles 
88.69 22.33 53.43 144.52 
Fatality Rate Series 
 
Deaths per 100,000 
registered vehicles 
3.34 1.22 1.40 6.83 
Injury Rate Series 
 
Injuries per 100,000 
registered vehicles 
119.68 31.58 70.77 206.06 
Independent Variables      
Fines (0-1) 
 
Dummy Variable 0.70 0.46 0 1 
On the Spot Payment (0-1) 
  
Dummy Variable 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Blood Alcohol Concentration 
 
Dummy Variable 0.092 0.29 0 1 
Control Variables      
Vehicle Inspections 
 
Inspections per 100,000 
registered vehicles 
62668 15571 26782 108377 
Precipitation 
 




Table 2 – Least-squares estimates, semi-log models for traffic accident, injury and fatality 
rates  



































































































































































































Standard Errors in parentheses; Errors of the Fatality Rate Series are calculated using the Newey-West HAC 
Consistent Covariance estimator; t-statistics below standard errors; Monthly dummies are omitted  
* P<0.10 level; ** P<0.05 level; *** P<0.01 level. 
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